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RECENT DECISIONS
TRUSTS-Principal and Income Act-Mutual Funds-The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in interpreting sections 5(1) and 5(3) of the Principal
and Income Act of 1947' has held that mutual fund distributions desig-
nated as realized capital gains are allocable to principal.
In Re Estate of Brock, 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281 (1966).
In In Re Estate of Brock2 a trust was created with gifts of income total-
ing $18,700 payable to seven primary beneficiaries. Any income in ex-
cess of that amount was to be paid to two secondary beneficiaries and
upon the death of any beneficiary, that portion of income released by such
death was to be divided between Bryn Mawr College and the Penn-
sylvania Academy of Fine Arts. At the time of the trial three of the
primary beneficiaries and one secondary beneficiary, the appellant, were
alive. The trustees invested in seven shares of the Philadelphia Fund,
Inc., a mutual fund registered as a regulated investment company. In
1964 the trustees received a distribution of one dollar and five cents
from the fund designated as seven cents a share from ordinary income
and eight cents a share from realized capital gains. The dividend was
payable in cash or additional shares of the fund. The trustees elected to
take the dividend in cash and filed an account crediting the entire dis-
tribution to income. Bryn Mawr objected to the allocation of the fifty-
six cents designated as realized capital gains to income.' Its position
was upheld by the lower court; the life beneficiary appealed.4
The proper allocation of the distribution is uncertain primarily because
of the nature of a mutual fund. Investment companies or mutual funds
were created to fill the needs of the small investor for a diversified port-
folio and for expert management of his securities. By combining the
resources of many small investors for the purchase, holding, and sale of
corporate stocks and securities both of these objectives are achieved.
Income is derived in the form of cash, received as interest or dividends
on the securities held, or capital gains, which result from the sale or
exchange of securities at a profit. According to federal law, the mutual
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1947).
2. 420 Pa. 454, 218 A.2d 281 (1966).
3. All parties agreed that forty-nine cents was properly allocated to income.
4. Rsv. RUL. 60-385, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 170; provides that where a will creates a
trust with income payable to someone for life and the principal thereafter to charity and
the trustee is empowered to invest in mutual or regulated investment company funds, the
remainder to charity will not qualify for the charitable deduction under federal estate tax
law if, under the applicable state law, any capital gains distribution on the shares of the
mutual or regulated investment company would be allocated to income and distributed to
the income beneficairy. Fifty-nine estates in the Philadelphia area alone are affected by this
decision involving taxes in excess of $3,600,000.
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fund in declaring a dividend must designate the source thereof as ordi-
nary income or capital gains.5 This dual aspect of dividends has created
problems concerning the proper allocation of mutual fund distributions
between principal and income.6
Prior to this decision three Pennsylvania county courts,7 in line with
several other jurisdictions,' had held that mutual fund distributions were
allocable to income. This result was reached through the use of the
stock-in-trade theory,9 which characterizes the securities held by the
mutual fund as inventory items. Since the securities are treated as an
inventory item, the sale of such securities gives rise to ordinary income.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this analysis and adopted the
conduit theory1 ° previously followed by only the Massachusetts Supreme
Court." Under the conduit theory the mutual fund is not considered an
entity but merely a conduit between the investor and the investments
made by the fund. An analogy is drawn between the mutual fund in-
5. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1940).
6. For a more complete discussion of mutual funds and the theories concerning them,
see 98 A.L.R.2d 511 and 18 Sw. L.J. 508 (1964).
7. Summerfield Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 526 (1962); Cohen Estate, 13 Fid. Repr. 209
(1963); Lovett Estate, 78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (1951). These cases are distinguishable from the
present case either because they did not involve the Principal and Income Act or because
they interpreted a different section of the Act.
8. Bryne's Estate, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1948); Briel v. Moody, 77 N.J. Super.
306, 186 A.2d 314 (1962); Rosenberg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960);
Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123 N.W.2d 69 (1963); Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874
(Mo. 1957) ; cases collected in 98 A.L.R.2d 511 (1964). The holding of three of these courts
has been changed by statute. MD. CODE ANN. art. 75B, 6(c) (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN.
3A:14A-5 (1953); McK PERSoNAL PROPERrY LAW, 27(e) (1962).
In all, fifteen states allocate realized capital gains to principal. Seven states have
accomplished the allocation to principle by the adoption of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act of 1962. IDAHO CODE, 68-1006(c) (1948); KAN. STAT. ANNi. 58-905(c) (1964);
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 9:2148(c) (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. 2679(6)(c) (1957); MD. CODE
ANN. art. 75B, 6(c) (1957); CODE OP LAWS OF S.C. tit. 67-509(c) (1962); Wyo. STAT.
34-379(c) (1957). Eight states have enacted separate legislation to achieve this result. CONN.
GEN. STAT. 45-113(1) (1958); FLA. STAT. ch. 690.06(1) (1965); 18 ME. RV. STAT. ANN.
4054 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. 3A:14A-5 (1953); McK PERSONAL PRoPaRTY LAW, 27(e)
(1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. 37-5(e) (1950).; TENN. CODE ANN. 35-706(1) (1950); Wis. STAT.
231.40(5)(a) (1963). Three states allocate capital gains to income unless stated to be
otherwise by the declaring corporation. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 30, § 164 (1965) ; 60 OxLA. STAT.
1961, 175.29(a); Tax. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-29 (1960). Two other states make the
allocation to income by judicial decision. Gardner's Trust, 266 Minn. 127, 123 N.W.2d 69
(1963); Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957).
9. BOGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 858 (2d ed. 1955).
10. In a direct investment and common trust fund participation, capital gains are
credited to principal. By analogy, the proponents of this view conclude that the fund as a
mere conduit should reach the same result. Scott takes the position that allocating capital
gains to income is unsatisfactory, but does not specifically mention the conduit theory. 3
ScoTT, TRUsTS § 236.14 (2d ed. 1956).
11. Tait v. Peck, 346 Mass. 521, 194 N.E.2d 707 (1964).
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vestor and a direct investor or common trust fund participant. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court, acting without a Principal and Income
Act,12 utilized common law principles in applying capital gain dividends
to principal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was able to achieve the
same result by applying sections 5(1) and 5(3) of the Principal and
Income Act of 1947 which provide:
Section 5(1). Corporate distributions made to a trustee in the
shares of the distributing corporation, however de-
scribed or designated by the distributing corporation,
shall be deemed principal but if the number of shares
of any class distributed to shareholders of such class
is six per cent (6%) or less of the number of shares
of that class outstanding on the record date for such
distribution, the shares so distributed shall be deemed
income. Except as provided above and in other sub-
sections of this section all dividends payable otherwise
than in shares of the distributing corporation, including
ordinary and extraordinary cash dividends and divi-
dends payable in shares or other securities or obliga-
tions of corporations other than the distributing cor-
poration, shall be deemed income. Where the trustee
shall have the option of receiving a dividend, either in
cash or in the shares of the distributing corporation, it
shall be considered as a cash dividend and deemed in-
come, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Section 5(3). Where the assets of a corporation are liqui-
dated, wholly or partially, amounts paid upon corporate
shares as cash dividends, declared before such liquida-
tion began, or as arrears of cumulative preferred, or
guaranteed dividends shall be deemed income, all
other amounts paid upon corporate shares on dis-
bursement of the corporate assets to the stockholders
shall be deemed principal. All disbursements of cor-
porate assets to the stockholders, whenever made, which
are designated by the corporation as a return of capital
or division of corporate property, shall be deemed
principal. Any profit or loss resulting from the sale
or liquidation of corporate shares shall enure to or fall
upon principal. [Emphasis supplied.]' 8
The court found itself in the anomalous position of reaching the same
12. Massachusetts does not have a Principal and Income Act. Tait v. Peck, supra note 11.
13. PA. STAT. AwrsN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1)(3) (1947).
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result as the lower courts unless some subsection of section 5 provided
to the contrary. The second sentence of subsection 5(3) seemed to pro-
vide the answer sought by the court since the fund had designated the
return as a "capital gain." The court relying on the word "capital"
stated: "Clearly, the fund has 'designated' this 'disbursement of its
corporate assets' as a return of 'capital' and, clearly, this distribution
falls within the second rule of section 5(3) and, therefore, must be
'deemed principal'."14
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, using the conduit theory as a
guide to the desired economic result, interpreted its statute to allocate
capital gains dividends to principal. Whether such an interpretation is
as clear as the majority15 would believe is at least open to question.
Sentence two of section 5(3) could very well pertain to the return of
paid-in or surplus-capital or capitalized earnings. Perhaps the fund's
designation of the return as "capital" can be explained by the fact that
such designation is required by federal law.'" Another persuasive factor
to be considered is that three states which have a provision identical to
sentence two of section 5(3) have made separate provision for the dis-
tributions from mutual funds.' 7 The Pennsylvania court also relies on
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act of 1962.18 Although this
Act has not been adopted in Pennsylvania, the court noted that the re-
vision allocating capital gains to principal must have been necessary to
remove the confusion which had arisen over the language of subsection
5(3). Whether such reliance is valid depends on whether this provision
was intended as a revision or as an addition. In the commissioners'
prefatory notes to the 1962 Act it is stated: "Provision is also made for
treatment of the distributions of a regulated investment company or
real estate investment trust."'19 This statement indicates that an addition,
not a revision, was intended.
The crux of the problem seems to be in the court's adoption of the
conduit theory to reach the desired result. The use of the conduit theory
or the stock-in-trade theory is nothing more than the utilization of a
fiction. The conduit theory disregards the very entity of the fund, a fact
14. 420 Pa. 454, 473, 218 A.2d 281, 290 (1966).
15. Justice Roberts disagreed that the conduit theory expressed an accurate characteriza-
tion of a mutual fund because it disregards the entity of the fund thus distorting the true
economic consequences. He concluded that a more accurate picture was presented by the
stock-in-trade theory advocated by Professor Bogert. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 858
(2d ed. 1955).
16. Investment Company Act df 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1940).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 37-5(c)(2) (1950); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-706(1) (1955); Wis.
STAT. § 231.40(5)(c) (1963).
18. Uniform Laws Annotated, 9B Miscellaneous Acts, Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act at 190 (Supp. 1962).
19. Uniform Laws Annotated, 9B Miscellaneous Acts, supra note 18 at 191.
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seemingly as indisputable as taxes. On the other hand, the stock-in-trade
theory, in classifying the securities as an inventory item, disregards the
character of the asset being sold. Stocks and bonds have traditionally
been considered as capital assets and to treat them differently serves no
purpose except to permit the return to be credited to income. The busi-
ness of the mutual fund, as the court emphasized, is a "unique busi-
ness"; 2 ° a business so identified should, like the banking and insurance
businesses, be the subject of exact and comprehensive legislative regula-
tion. This suggestion is not intended to mean that the court should be-
come a super-legislature. The court should interpret the Act and, if a
situation is not provided for in the Act, the case should be decided ac-
cording to other principles. It is paradoxical that the court must disre-
gard the entity of the fund to reach the desired economic result; then
rely on that entity's designation of the distribution as a capital gain to
interpret its statute.
One troublesome question left unanswered by the court is the retro-
active application of Brock. If a trustee has paid capital gain distribu-
tions to the life beneficiary, the beneficiary may be liable for the return
of such funds. The Restatement of Trusts First and Second provides:
If the trustee has made a payment out of trust property to one
of several beneficiaries to which the beneficiary was not entitled,
such beneficiary is personally liable for the amount of such
overpayment, and his beneficial interest is subject to a charge
for the repayment thereof, unless he has so changed his position
that it is inequitable to compel him to make repayment. 21
The Restatement position has been accepted by the Pennsylvania
courts in at least two lower court decisions.2 2 In a case23 decided prior
to the publication of the Restatement of Trusts, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court adopted a position later followed by the drafters of the
Restatement. In an action by a trustee to recover funds wrongfully paid,
the court quoted with approval from the case of Northrop v. Graves :24
20. 420 Pa. 454, 463, 218 A.2d 281, 285 (1966).
21. Restatement, Second, Trusts § 254. This provision is identical to § 254 of the first
Restatement of Trusts.
22. In Dougherty Estate, 7 Fid. Repr. 138 (1957), the trustee brought suit against
decedent's estate to recover money paid by mistake. Instead of paying a one-fifth interest as
provided by the will the trustee had paid a one-half interest. The court quoted the Re-
statement view with approval, but limited recovery to a six year period in accordance with
the statute of limitations. Likewise, in Weaver's Estate, 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 57 (1958), the
trustee through an improper interpretation of the will had overpaid one beneficiary. The
court permitted recovery against the beneficial interest even though the will contained a
spendthrift provision.
23. Union Trust Company of N.Y. v. Gilpin, 235 Pa. 524 (1912).
24. 19 Conn. 548 (1849).
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We mean distinctly to assert that where money is paid by one
under a mistake of his rights and his duty, and which he was
under no legal or moral obligation to pay, and which the re-
cipient has no right in good conscience to retain, it may be re-
covered back in an action of indebitatus assumpsit whether such
mistake be one of fact or law; and this we insist may be done
both upon principle of Christian morals and the common law.2 1
Even though the result reached by the court is in accord with the ma-
jority of jurisdictions today, its adoption of the conduit theory and its
interpretation of section 5(3) to allocate capital gains dividends to prin-
cipal has created more problems than it has solved. It is apparent that the
only solution rests with the legislature. A bill2" providing for the alloca-
tion of capital gains dividends to income was introduced in 1961; the
bill died in committee. But the confusion in this area today indicates it
is time for the legislature to act to resolve the problems which have
arisen out of mutual fund distributions.
Richard E. Myers
CRIMINAL LAw-Criminal Procedure-Accused's loss of memory sur-
rounding events of alleged criminal act held not to entitle him to a dis-
charge from the indictment or stay of proceedings.
Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A.2d
758(1966).
Relator was indicted for first degree murder. The only evidence pre-
sented of the alleged murder was circumstantial and, at best, incon-
clusive.1 A pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed re-
questing that (1) the murder indictment be dismissed and relator be
discharged from custody, or (2) the trial on the indictment be post-
poned. The petition averred that while the relator was at no time insane
or incompetent, he was suffering from a permanent loss of memory of
the events and circumstances implicating him in the alleged murder. In
dismissing the petition the lower court found that relator was not feign-
ing the amnesia but did not determine its expected duration. On appeal
the supreme court held, with two Justices dissenting, ". . . that defendant
is not entitled at this time (1) to a discharge from the indictment, or
(2) to a stay of proceedings .... 112
25. Union Trust Company of N.Y. v. Gilpin, 235 Pa. 524, 530 (1912).
26. House Bill 592, Session of 1961.
1. The ballistics report stated only that the bullets taken from the victim were of the
same general class characteristics as bullets test-fired from the revolver which police had
found in relator's car. A more positive identification was not made.
2. Commonwealth ex rel. Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 406, 218 A.2d 758, 763 (1966).
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